

Conflict Decision Processes: With Illustrations from Ireland

International Scientific Journal of Methods and Models of Complexity: ISJ M&MC

An Interdisciplinary Journal for Research of Complexity, ISSN- 0928-3137

Published on Internet by SISWO, University of Amsterdam, <http://www.nosmo.nl/isj/>

Cathal M. Brugha

School of Business, University College Dublin, Ireland.

Abstract. This paper uses Nomology, a decision science approach to structuring qualitative decisions, to put Drama Theory, and Confrontation and Collaboration Analysis, into a framework based on a succession of dichotomies. The first dichotomy is based on whether the two parties mainly agree or disagree. The second is based on whether to use direct or indirect action. These combine to form four General Political Adjustment Activities, which have corresponding dilemmas: Collaboration (Integration), Cooperation (Agreement), Confrontation (Persuasion) and Conflict (Escalation). The third dichotomy is based on whether to use a more personal approach or to use one's position, such as one's control over resources, people and influence. This generates eight Principal Political Adjustment Activities along with corresponding Dilemmas: Unilateralism (Backlash), Negotiation (Recognition), Credibility (Awareness), Trust (Renegé), Inducement (Rejection), Deterrence (Incitement), Positioning (Vulnerability), and Threat (Weakness). Of these, Unilateralism and Negotiation are new to Drama Theory. Also, most of the dilemmas are named here for the first time. The paper is illustrated with examples from conflict in Ireland, and uses the model to suggest how the United States might move away from a unilateralist approach to dealing with international terrorism.

Keywords: Decision Science, Nomology, Systems, Development, Adjustment, Drama Theory, Conflict

1. Introduction

This paper is the first of two about conflict decision processes. It seeks to add to work that has been done over the past decade on applying game theory ideas to strategies about conflict. It hopes to do this by fitting what has been discovered about conflict into a generic framework based on Nomology, the science of the laws of the mind (Brugha, 1998a,b,c). More complex discussions of Nomology will be confined as much as possible to the second paper, which will appear in a later issue of this journal.

Many of us who work in the field of complex societal processes come from technical backgrounds such as mathematics, science and engineering. So we have conceptual difficulties when we venture into territories where the physical sciences can at best provide us with a few metaphors to help understand the deeper issues of human behaviour. As people who live in the real world and who have a very good analytical training we are not exactly unequipped for this kind of study. But should we become experts in philosophy? Derived from the Greek words *philos* and *sophos*, literally lover of wisdom, philosophy suggests something to do with being sensible and supportive in one's dealings with others. (Being philosophical about something suggests being sensible about one's own disappointments.) Traditional philosophy does not offer

enough of the knowledge we require to understand the *frameworks* that underlie people's decision *processes*. We need a deeper and more analytical insight into decision-making *structures* in general. (Here we use the idea of *structures* as the fundamental building blocks for making decisions. A *framework* is some combination of *structures* that has been put together for a particular purpose. A *process* is a series of actions or steps that follows a pattern corresponding to some *framework*.)

Philosophers in the nineteenth century sought to understand the *structures*, *frameworks* and *processes* that appear to govern human behaviour and development. Although in the background of many research endeavours, very few people study these specifically as a field. Its formal title of Nomology, the science of the laws of the mind, is credited to philosopher William Hamilton (1877). Henry Tappan (1855, pp. 70-85) named it at least as early as 1844, and described there being two "General Conceptions", the first "Substance, endowed with faculties or functions, and causes or forces" and the second "Laws, or that which determines and regulates the manifestations and movements of the first". Philosophy in relation to the first had been known as Metaphysics after the Greek words *meta* and *physika*, literally beyond the physical, or not explainable using physical laws. For instance, we cannot measure strengths of feeling or conviction using analogies with sizes of tables and chairs (although many try to do so). Tappan called philosophy in relation to the laws of metaphysics Nomology after the Greek words *nomos* and *logos*, literally the doctrine of law. It is now understood to mean "Covering Laws" or "Regularities" in the patterns or structures of thinking. Frequently it is used to describe "Nomological Maps" or "Nets" that help to locate where one is in a decision process. Our interest is in how these regularities apply to decision-making in general, and can help to improve management practice.

Nomology is based on the premise that intelligent beings' choices tend to follow a common set of simple decision rules. It uses formal principles and axioms to extend the understanding of systems, the most foundational of which (Principle 1 "Simplicity": Brugha, 1998a) is that "decision making processes, in general, are invariant and more likely to be simple than complex". Brugha (1998a,b,c) has used Nomology to synthesise research from management, psychology and other fields into a unified framework. This built on work by Hamilton (1877) who credited Kant with having formulated ideas corresponding to knowing, feeling and willing, which operate as levels which Hamilton called *somatic*, *psychic* and *pneumatic*. (See Kant (1987) for a recent translation.) Brugha showed that these correspond to three *phases* of a *committing* process, a systems development example of which is Analysis, Design and Implementation. (Throughout this paper italics are used for words that have been defined explicitly to explain concepts in Nomology. Quotation marks are used to emphasise specifically their nomological meaning. Words put in bold indicate they have been newly defined.)

Brugha (1998c) also showed how Kant's insights into the dialectic correspond to three *stages* in a parallel *convincing* process. (See Kant (1985) for a recent translation.) One first resolves *technical* issues, then relates the problem to its *context*, and finally deals with it within its *situation*.

Committing and *convincing* are independent dimensions that combine into two *layers* of a *development* process, where a decision-maker or group wishes explicitly to be *convinced* before moving from one *phase* of *committing* to the next. An example of a process that follows such a structure is a hierarchy of levels of human activity (Table 1).

Table 1. Hierarchy of Levels of Needs, Preferences and Values

Introverted Development - Committing Phases	Extroverted Development - Convincing Stages		
	Technical - Self	Contextual - Others	Situational - Business
Somatic – Needs	Physical	Political	Economic
Psychic – Preferences	Social	Cultural	Emotional
Pneumatic – Values	Artistic	Religious	Mystical

The core idea of Nomology is that decisions tend to follow generic structures such as this, and that combinations such as in Table 1 shape our understanding of language, such as what we mean by words like “political”. This affects the way we should interpret research. For instance, Maslow (1987) asserted that there existed a Hierarchy of Needs as follows: Physical, Safety, Love, Esteem, and, finally, Self-Actualisation. Nomology would suggest that his research partially revealed the inherent structure. Brugha (1998c) showed that Safety corresponds to the *political* and *economic* levels, Love to the *social* level, and that Self-Actualisation is about a person *artistically* “creating” their own *development*.

Nomology is very much a mapping process, in which gaps in systems that emerge from research are investigated and filled. In this case the questions were mainly two. Is the hierarchy Maslow researched only about needs? The answer is no. Their nature changes as one develops. They are better described as *needs*, *preferences* and *values*. The other question is what lies above Self-Actualisation? The answer, *religious* and *mystical*, emerges from the idea that this nine-level system should be complete and incorporate all such *levels*.

Because this is an important generic system the answer to such questions should be almost obvious, and certainly testable. Finally, there should be plenty of corroborating evidence. In fact Maslow’s later (1971) explorations into the higher levels confirm this.

This paper is about “framing and naming” activities that happen in politics. It starts by revealing a framework that people involved in politics use subconsciously. Then it uses the framework to give names to the different activities that form the language of politics. The belief is that “framing and naming” can help to inform politicians about their choices.

2. Adjusting Processes

One of the ideas central to Nomology is that there are limited kinds of decision structure, and that all decision practice should fit into these structures. Brugha (1998a,b,c) carried out extensive trawls of qualitative structures that emerged from either established systems or empirical evidence. These indicated that systems that did not fit into the above dialectical structures of *committing* and *convincing* appeared to be based on balances between opposites or contrasts, i.e. *adjusting*.

From analysis of many cases in management practice it became clear that people address adjusting problems using the same approach, which is based on asking questions that have dichotomous answers. The first question they address is “*what* kind of problem was it?” should it involve more *planning* or more *putting* plans into effect? Generally the second question is “*where* was the focus of the problem?” Is it more concerned with the *people* involved or more with “*place*” issues? The third question is “*which way* to solve the problem?” Should it be more

a *personal* or a *positional* approach? (Sometimes the second and third questions are interchanged.) Combining the answers to these dichotomies led to the formalisation of four *general* and eight *principal adjustment* activities (Figure 1 Brugha, 1998a,b). This was described as an *adjustment* system because remedying the imbalances in the dichotomies acts as a mechanism for reducing excessive emphasis on particular approaches to solving problems in organisations. The outer ring of Figure 1 contains four proposed “*general political adjustment activities*” and corresponding dilemmas that will be introduced in Section 3.

Adjusting is very different to *committing* and *convincing*, in that *adjusting* always seeks to find a balance. In that sense it is more *objective*. On the other hand how one decides on one’s *commitments* and *convictions* is more *subjective*. See Brugha (1998a) for a deeper discussion of how *subjective* ownership of a decision leads to the disappearance of the “*pull*” activity in *adjustment* decision-making.




Fig. 1: General Political Adjustment Activities

Brugha (1998c) has described applications of *development* decision-making, i.e. ones that have a two-layer *committing* and *convincing* structure (Table 1). He has used this structure to describe the relationship between the *stages* of a project *development process*, such as the systems development lifecycle in information systems.

Brugha (2001) has also shown that the implementation of this cycle uses the rules of *adjustment* decision-making. The processing of each *stage* is carried out as a third *layer* of activity that is embedded to an extent within the other two *layers*. The evidential basis he called on for this was observations of the *Professional Work Practice* approach in information systems (Iivari *et al.* 1998).

The idea is that there is a “proper” or *objective* way to carry out each *development stage*. The principal requirement is that there should be balance in the usage of alternative managerial approaches. For instance a manager could cause harm by bringing to the job a particular bias in favour of *planning* as against *putting* plans into effect. Having an awareness of such potential imbalances can offset such a bias. Another benefit is that the model can be used to match the needs of any task with the management styles of the existing members of a task force when recruiting new members.

The combination of alternatives arising from the first two dichotomies produces four *general* activities: *proposing* what to do, forming *perceptions* about it, causing a “pull” momentum, and then a “push” to implement it. A third dichotomy differentiates *adjustment* decision-making (four activities) from *development* decision-making (three activities: “pull” no longer applying).

A fourth *adjustment* dichotomy divides the four *general activities* into eight *principal activities*. These *activities* can be viewed as “tools” and be used independently or within each *development* stage as part of a project cycle. They reflect an unfolding process that could go through the whole cycle or just the first few steps around the “adjusting wheel” described in Figure 1. For example, someone simply proposing a workable solution might solve the problem very easily. Typically those who are in *place* in the organisation, who have control over the resources, usually will first try some solution that does not involve too many other *people*. The combination of a *proposition* activity that is done using one's *position* (i.e. the control one has over resources, people or influence) is described as *pounce*, a sudden shift in direction of resources or emphasis that has not been widely discussed or agreed. The alternative way to solve a problem is by focus on the *person* instead of on one's *position*. If a *pounce* solution is inadequate then go “in *person*” to those who are in *place* in the organisation and see how the problem affects the work that they do. So, a *proposition* activity that is centred on the activities of each *person* involved would be directed at improving the *procedure* whereby the problem is usually solved.

If following the usual *procedure* to sort out the problems has not succeeded in dealing with a situation, it will be necessary to develop a better *perception* of what should happen in that stage. The initial preference is to use some measure of what *people* think, such as “what value would people put on this activity?” The combination of a *perception* activity that is found through examining one's *position* (i.e. in some competition for resources) is described as the *price* that people might associate with a particular choice. The other extreme within the *perception* activity is to focus on the *person* instead of on one's *position*. Each *person* can be asked to contribute as part of a group process so that a combined *perception* can be formulated. This can lead to the development of a new *policy* for the group.

The formation of *policy* is the summit of the *planning* activities. Once the *policy* for dealing with the problem has been decided upon then the balance moves from *planning* to *putting* plans into effect. The next step entails the first of the *putting* activities. As with *policy* this is aimed at *people* and uses a *personal* approach, so the demands of the change are not excessive. Having developed the *policy* and got it agreed, it is now necessary to *pull* the people into line. Initially the focus is on the *person* instead of on one's *position*. Each *person* needs to be persuaded individually, or as part of a team, to implement the *policy*. Thus, a *pull* activity that emphasises primarily the involvement of each individual *person* corresponds to *promotion*. If the benefits of using *promotion* begin to diminish, the focus changes to using an objective measure of the contribution to the agreed goal. A *pull* activity that is evaluated using one's *position* (i.e. in some

competition for resources) corresponds to the *productivity* of the people or departments in the organisation. The kinds of questions that are asked under *productivity* are similar to those asked under *price*. “How does this or that contribution improve our *position*?”

The nature of the *putting* activity then changes from a *pull* to a *push* activity aimed at the structures and practices of the organisation that require changing. If the *pull* activities, with all their emphasis on getting people to work for the common goal, have shown up some faults or weaknesses in the institutional structures and methods, it then becomes opportune to impose or push through appropriate changes. So, the first focus is on the *person* instead of on one's *position*. Through examining each *person*'s informal relationships within the organisation it may be possible to define a better formal structure that reflects the new directions and targets. Correspondingly, a *push* activity that re-orientates the *place* to correspond to the needs of each *person* involved is dependent on the *pliability* of the organisation and its structures. A lack of *pliability* can be a significant stumbling block to progress particularly in large organisations. Fitting the structures to the current needs leads to greater focus and a clarification of any difficulties with putting plans into effect. Once the structures are in place it is important to not continue adapting them. At the other extreme on the *position / person* axis, the combination of a *push* activity that is done using one's *position* is described as *practice*, the ongoing administration of the work of the organisation in a regular way. The emphasis is on using one's *position* to complete the process.

A fifth adjustment dichotomy (Axiom 16 “Whether”) “considers the question whether, within any activity, it is appropriate to focus on increases in *power* or on its control so as to ensure the necessary balance between and progression through all the activities when solving a problem”. This applies within each of the eight *principal activities* (Axiom 17 “Punch / Prevention”): “The cycle is controlled by two processes: the first *punch*, which increases the *power* needed to deal with the activity, and then *prevention*, which ensures the completion of that activity and the move onto the next one in the sequence”. Management must decide when it is appropriate to finish using each activity (Axiom 18 “Pure / Pragmatic”): “The most dynamic organisation has a high tolerance for and a large spread of differentiation of usage and balance between the various activities it uses, and this is controlled by the *punch* and *prevention* processes, which correspond to providing a balance between a *pure* and a *pragmatic* approach to each activity.” This last dichotomy provides the basis for sixteen adjustment processes.

The choice between pairs of dichotomies (Figure 1) are determined “on balance” in the mind of the decision-makers.

3. Political Activity as an Adjusting Process

Nomology's Simplicity Principle makes the strong claim that people use a limited set of decision structures, and that decision practice should fit into these structures. This claim is balanced by a strong test. If this three *layer* system that applies in information systems is truly a generic one it should also apply elsewhere, including to political activity, and there should be evidence of this. It makes no sense to have artificial barriers between fields and disciplines. Indeed, politics pervades everywhere, including information systems. The next focus of our investigation is to explore this third layer in political activity.

In one sense this study is simpler than that for information systems where the third *layer* of activity applied throughout all the stages of the systems development lifecycle. Here we need consider only what happens within the second *stage* of Table 1, politics. We can ignore the first two layers for the time being. The second paper will address this more complicated task.

The idea is to test if the generic *adjusting* structure has shaped the *constructs* that people use when making decisions about politics. By *constructs* we mean all the terms used, for instance, in Figure 1. This is a strong test in that it is not enough to find a fit with some of them and not others. We expect that all the *adjusting* constructs should have meaning in a political context, although expressed in the language of politics.

The discussion is divided into two parts, dealing first with the four *general* and later with the eight *principal adjustment* activities (Figure 1: Brugha, 1998a,b). Running through the cycle twice should help to clarify understanding of the constructs.

We start by introducing the relatively recent but very important development in the field of politics, “Drama Theory” (DT) (Howard *et al*, 1992, Howard, 1994, Bryant, 2004). DT describes the political inter-play between characters (in the drama leading up to a serious conflict) as episodes that require the facing of six dilemmas. We will show below that DT should be extended to eight activities each of which has a corresponding dilemma.

The nomological method for doing this involves first seeing them in the context of the generic system (Principle 4 “Evaluating and Interpreting”: Brugha, 1998b). Then it requires deconstructing, reconstructing and completing them in the context of the generic system (Principle 5 “Deconstructing, Reconstructing and Completing”: Brugha, 1998a). Finally one describes the constructs using natural language (Principle 2 “Natural Language”) and words that are similar to each other, with the differences in the words specific to the differences in the concept” (Principle 3 “Similar Words, Specific Differences”: Brugha, 1998a).

DT is usually confined to describing the activities that two parties engage in before (or hopefully instead of) engaging in actual serious conflict. The implication of our “generic” proposal is that it should apply more generally, both to during a conflict and to any form of political conflict, including conflict within organisations and businesses. This raises a doubt about how generally usable are the DT words that are associated with the six dilemmas: *cooperation*, *trust*, *inducement*, *deterrence*, *positioning* and *threat*. Because a culture has been built around them, we propose to not change these words (with one exception, which will be explained below). But we will suggest that some of the words may have to be interpreted more broadly. For instance, *threat* should mean the prospect of carrying out or continuing to carry out aggressive action against another party.

The fifth *adjustment* dichotomy suggests that the decision-maker uses each activity in its *pure* form for a while. Then, when it no longer works as successfully, a *pragmatic* decision is made to move on to the next activity. In DT this is presented as a dilemma - should an activity be abandoned if it appears to be no longer working, or might actually do more harm than good?

3.1 Confrontation and Collaboration Analysis

Since it was first proposed DT has been actively used and tested, and then modified, first into Confrontation Analysis (Bennett, P. 1998; Murray-Jones *et al*, 1999) and more recently into Confrontation and Collaboration Analysis (CCA). Murray-Jones *et al*, (2003) have expressed the nomological-like aspiration that “DT must hold for any kind of human decision maker, from any

society or age group” (p. 9). They suggested that DT “needs to be tested” (p. 2), and has six dilemmas “at this point” (p. 3). Their extensive experimental work led to a more clear distinction between collaborative and confrontational interactions (p. 6) and to a “modified theory”, which has four phases: “*collaboration*” and “*cooperation*” (corresponding to when positions agree) and “*confrontation*” and “*conflict*” (corresponding to when positions disagree) (Figure 4, p 8). We see this as a key nomological insight into both main descriptors of the general adjustment activities and the first dichotomy. From here we adopt these in Figure 1 above as an appropriate set of *General Political Adjustment Activities*. We also adopt “*agree/disagree*” as the appropriate expressions for the *planning/putting* dichotomy.

The theory underpinning Nomology suggests that *constructs* such as these emerge from the way people shape their decisions. Consequently, if CCA can be explained as an *adjusting* structure, then so should DT from which CCA derived. (We will show below that this is indeed the case.) This extension of the strictness of Nomology’s test leads to a new principle. (Earlier principles and axioms are in previous papers, many of which are referred to in this paper.)

Principle 9 “Generic Systems”: If they apply to one case, generic nomological systems must apply to all similar cases and variations that arise from consistent and extensive empirical evidence.

Nomology helps to understand the thinking behind the formation of *constructs*. Their division on the basis of *agreeing* or *disagreeing* corresponds to a change from *planning* (the *disagreement*) to *putting* (the *disagreement* into effect). The *adjustment* that takes place is to the “*relationships*” between the two parties as they move into *disagreement*, which may end in conflict. Consequently, the starting point is that the two parties are united. *Conflict* is possible but not certain. Hence *collaboration* should be understood to be a *phase* during which unity is possibly under threat and *disintegration* is a *proposition*.

Collaboration is about people, communities or nations clearly working together, with jointly held interests. If one controls the other, the relationship need not always be a happy one to constitute a *collaboration*, as in the case of an empire that exploits its colony. However, where there are two very distinct communities, races or cultures, such as in Northern Ireland or South Africa (discussed in the second paper), genuine *collaboration* should be about neither dominating the other, but based on having a common destiny because both share the same *place* (top half of Figure 1).

Using the ideas from adjustment decision-making, as unity declines the relationship cannot be described as *collaboration*; it is more separate. *Cooperation* is where both parties have differentiated interests. They see themselves as distinct *people* (bottom half of Figure 1), and not necessarily likely to have common concerns other than indirectly. Any working together is mediated by evaluating the *perceptions* of the parties; how will working together affect the interests of both. If the relationship declines further to the point of *disagreement* then *confrontation* takes over, and the emphasis moves into a *pull* phase and trying to get the other side to do what one wants. If this fails the last resort is to *conflict* to *push* for the result one wants.

In Nomology, as one applies a system to more diverse applications it is likely that one will become dissatisfied with the names of the constructs, such as *collaboration*, *cooperation*,

confrontation and *conflict*. The resolution of this problem is to rely more on the generic names *proposition*, *perception*, *pull* and *push*, and on the dimensions that drive the construction of the four phases.

This paper very specifically explores what is understood by *collaboration*, and how it differs from *cooperation*. Understandably these terms are often used interchangeably. Furthermore, we are not suggesting that *collaboration* is necessarily a more peaceful version of *cooperation*. When parties are very different it may be far easier to *cooperate* than to *collaborate*. Ultimately these are decision *constructs*. If enemies decide to sit down together and re-write the rules (e.g. the constitution) by which they run a country (*place*) they have to *collaborate* in such a project, whereas they could *cooperate* on indirect or “third” issues such as *agreements* to do with energy or tourism that affect both communities (*people*). In the language of politics this *place/people* generic dichotomy is described as “*direct/indirect*”. We will use these designations for the remainder of this application of Nomology.

The word *cooperate* means to work together, from the Latin *opus* for a task. The sense of “together” is *indirect* because only the work joins the parties involved. They could carry out different tasks as part of the work, and never meet. The connection is the *people* (Figure 1) for whom the work is done. The word *collaborate* comes from the Latin *co* and *laborare*, and also means to work together, but, in this case, *directly* in the sense of “labouring” together in the one *place*. The word “*collaborator*” has bad connotations from wartime where some of the local population work with and for the invader. In fact this is not a mis-usage of the term, in that the *collaborators* have accepted the right of the invader to be in their “*place*”.

This *people / place* distinction is illustrated by probably the most heated political issue in Southern Irish politics since Northern Ireland was established in 1922. From that time up until the mid-seventies the great aim of Irish nationalist politics was to end partition, which was equivalent to uniting Ireland, which meant ending British rule in Ireland. Southern Irish people rarely visited the north, and when they did all they saw were aspects about the *place* that annoyed them: red post boxes and symbols of British royalty everywhere. Now it is seen as a matter of uniting *people*: nationalists and unionists.

3.2 General Political Adjustment Activities and their Dilemmas

A parallel was shown between dilemmas and the *pragmatic* decision to move to the next of the eight *principal activities*. It follows from Principle 9 that the same reasoning should apply to moving between the four *general activities*. This leads to a refinement of Axiom 17 (above).

Axiom 17a “Punch / Prevention”: Punch / prevention can also apply to each of the four general activities.

We now propose dilemmas for each of the *general political adjusting activities* (see Figure 1) of *collaboration*, *cooperation*, *confrontation* and *conflict*. The dilemmas correspond to the *pragmatic* question whether to continue with an activity or move onto the next one in the sequence. We will introduce them in reverse order, starting with *conflict*, because *collaboration* is the most difficult concept to grasp. We will show that the difference between the two orders is as follows. Clockwise corresponds to where a stronger party tries to get a weaker party to *adjust* during a dispute. Anti-clockwise corresponds to a conflict resolution process in which two parties try to *adapt* to co-existing with one another. We will examine this in the second paper.

Conflict is a *push* activity that relies for success on having superior strength over one's opponents. We propose that inability to *push* through to a quick success against an opponent during this phase leads to the *conflict dilemma* that one might cause an "**escalation**" of the *conflict*. *Escalation* need not always be bad. It can sometimes "hasten the pace of negotiations" and "makes both sides more eager to settle" (Heifetz and Segev, 2005). However, the prospect of *escalation* can *prevent* one from *pushing* the other side too much; this is a *pragmatic* choice.

The difference between *conflict* and *confrontation* is between the aggressive use of *direct* action to get one's way, and the more defensive use of *indirect* action that tries to mediate through *people* (top versus bottom of Figure 2). Prior to getting into *conflict* it is better to try *confrontation*, which is a *pull* activity that tries to "*persuade*" the *people* on the other side to relent. The *confrontation dilemma* is that "**persuasion**" may fail, and make it difficult to avoid *conflict*. (*Persuasion* is occasionally used as one of DT's six dilemmas. We will explain later why we think that it would be better to locate it here.)

Before *confrontation* the parties go through a phase of *cooperation*. The difference is that with *cooperation* there is still the hope that, on balance, there is more *agreement* than *disagreement* between the parties. *Cooperation* relies on their being some mutuality in the *perceptions* of both parties. The *cooperation dilemma* is what to do if "**agreement**" is not achieved. This is the turning-point after which the positions *disagree*.

The difference between *cooperation* and *collaboration* is that *cooperation* recognises a distinction between the parties, whereas *collaboration* assumes that they are, or can be united, in some general way. The Prisoners' Dilemma in Game Theory exemplifies this difference. Two robbers have been caught in the vicinity of a crime. Immediately the police separate them and proceed to interrogate them, trying to get them to *cooperate* with the authorities. The prisoners are guilty, but there is not sufficient proof. If one *cooperates* in exchange for his freedom the other will get a very long sentence. But if both *cooperate* then both will get not so severe a sentence. If both are *collaborators* they should say nothing, in which case they will probably be held on remand for a short period pending a trial and then be freed. The prisoners' dilemma is a *collaboration dilemma*: can they retain their "**integration**" despite the efforts of the authorities to divide them?

3.3 Divide and Rule

Empires use "divide and rule" to control their colonies (from the Latin "divide et impera"). The Plantation of Ulster in 1609 with 20,000 English and Scottish Protestants reduced to tenant status any native Gaelic-Irish that remained. The Penal Laws of 1692 deprived the Catholics of their civil and property rights, in favour of Protestants. The Scots-Irish Presbyterian "Dissenters" were expected to keep the natives down. The Anglo-Irish landed gentry were the real beneficiaries,

getting rent from both the other groups. When groups of Catholic and Protestants *cooperated* to protest against high rents the Anglo-Irish “lords” became fearful that this might turn into a *collaboration*. They formed the Orange Order in 1795 so as to foster sectarianism against Catholics. Prior to the Rising of 1798 British General Knox frustrated Wolfe Tone’s hopes of uniting Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter (Presbyterian) by arranging to “increase the animosity between Orangemen and the United Irish” (De Paor, 1971).

The divide-and-rule policy also helped to cause the partition of India and Pakistan. The British Government exploited religious differences between Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs to foster ethnic strife, for example by encouraging the killing of cows for beef despite the offence this caused to Hindus.

They applied it likewise in Palestine. “Sir Ronald Storrs, the first Governor of Jerusalem, certainly had no illusions about what a ‘Jewish homeland’ in Palestine meant for the British empire: ‘It will form for England’, he said, ‘a little loyal Jewish Ulster in a sea of potentially hostile Arabism’”. (Hallinan, 2004)

These cases show that a divide-and-rule policy can cause a *collaboration dilemma* not just for the colony but also for the invading empire. What was intended to be a short-term device to establish their position has since become, for the British, a source of ongoing *disintegration* and dispute. Such a policy can diminish the governability of countries and reduce the benefits of colonisation. It can have ongoing repercussions long into the future, even after the empire has disappeared. In this retrospect the end clearly does not justify the means.

4 Principal Political Adjustment Activities and their Dilemmas

We now consider how DT’s six dilemmas (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drama_Theory; Crannell *et al.* 2005) fit into the *adjustment* decision-making framework in Figure 2. The list given in Wikipedia includes several variations. These are a Cooperation dilemma, a Trust dilemma, a Persuasion (also known as a Deterrence) dilemma, a Rejection (also known as an Inducement) dilemma, a Positioning dilemma, and a Threat dilemma. We will show that these correspond with six out of the eight *principal adjustment activities* in Figure 2: *price*, *policy*, *promotion*, etc. We will propose alternatives for Cooperation and Persuasion above, which we have already used above. We will propose new names for seven of these eight *principal dilemmas* (the exception being Rejection) in the outer ring of Figure 2, and suggest that these correspond to the *pragmatic* question whether to move onto the next one in the sequence of eight *principal adjusting activities*. Because the two additional dilemmas we are proposing are at the start of the cycle we will begin at the other end.

When testing for the fit of an empirically based system to a nomological generic we look for evidence that the inherent structure has influenced the developers’ understanding of the constructs. Bryant (2004) has described four of the six as dilemmas of *conflict*, which encourages a fit to the four on the left of Figure 2. Principle 9 would require that pairs of DT dilemmas should match the *phases* of the *general activities*.




Fig. 2: Principal Political Adjustment Activities

The more aggressive aspect of *conflict* is “*threat*”. This includes threatening actions and carrying them out, at least in part, in *practice*, but with the prospect of doing more. If an opponent refuses to back down the stronger party must implement its *threat* or face the *threat dilemma* of showing “**weakness**”. This is the last thing a stronger party should ever show because it entices revolt.

The other part of *conflict* is “*positioning*”, where the larger party is *pliable* about choosing what *position* it intends to defend or hold against any threat when in, preparing for, or trying to avoid *conflict*. Its very *pliability* causes a *positioning dilemma* of “**vulnerability**”, because it may appear uncertain or easy to push around. Also, in doing so, it exposes its position, shows its hand, and indicates to its opponent how it intends to deal with *conflict*.

Part of *confrontation* is “*deterrence*”, where the larger party tries to use its resources *productively* to impress the weaker party and force it to back down. The *deterrence dilemma* is where the weaker party may instead be “**incited**” into aggressive action, forcing the stronger party to consider *conflict*. When *deterrence* fails so does *confrontation* in terms of the cycle in Figure 2. Consequently, the *deterrence dilemma* becomes a *persuasion dilemma*, and *conflict* becomes a prospect. DT sometimes calls the *deterrence dilemma* a *persuasion dilemma* also. We prefer to use *persuasion* for the *confrontation* activity, because *inducement* and *deterrence* are both forms of *persuasion*.

The event that led to Irish independence was a fairly inauspicious rising by the Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army on Easter Monday 1916. They held several prominent buildings mainly in Dublin city for several days. The crowd jeered the leaders when they surrendered because of the loss of lives, the destruction of buildings, and the disruption to life in

the city. The British authorities court-martialled and executed Patrick Pearse, James Connolly and the other 1916 leaders. Instead of *detering* further support for the rebels this *incited* the Irish public into *conflict* with British rule and give popular support to Sinn Féin in the subsequent 1918 general election.

The other aspect of *confrontation* is “*inducement*”, where the larger party tries *personally* to *promote* its case using rewards. Here the *dilemma* is that the inducements are open to “*rejection*”. Increasing the *inducements* may not be enough. *Confrontation* may have to be made more *direct*.

Part of *cooperation* is “*trust*”, where both sides meet and *agree* on a “*policy*”. The *trust dilemma* for the stronger party is that the weaker party may “*renege*” on the *agreement*. Loss of *trust* leads to a failure to *agree*. This is the *cooperation dilemma* because it makes *confrontation* inevitable (see the cycle in Figure 2).

From this point we suggest further modifications to DT. The word *cooperation* is used both in CCA and in DT as a sixth dilemma. We propose instead to use “*credibility*” as a word for the other aspect of *cooperation*. This is where one party believes that it has a strong position and that the other party would not want to pay the *price* of challenging or disputing that position. A *credibility dilemma* is where the stronger party feels able and willing to use its strength to defeat the other, but doubts the weaker party’s “*awareness*” of this.

We give illustrations of these dilemmas below along with alternative ways that these dilemmas can be viewed.

5. Negotiation

We now suggest two additional activities, with corresponding dilemmas, under the heading *collaboration*. We use the Adjusting structure (Figure 2) and apply Principle 5 “Deconstructing, Reconstructing and Completing” to identify the characteristics of the missing activities and dilemmas. Because we are filling in gaps that have already been filled we expect from Principle 2 “Natural Language” that appropriate words are already in common use, “pieces of the jigsaw” that are obvious and near-to-hand. Following this line we suggest that part of *collaboration* is “*negotiation*”, where the larger party uses *procedures* to resolve political difficulties between the two parties.

Political negotiation often starts because both sides recognise the impossibility of their winning otherwise. When all else fails, *negotiation* could be a win-win game. However, it creates the *dilemma* that it involves “*recognition*” of one’s enemy’s authority to *negotiate* on behalf of their community. It gives them a status that they have been seeking; it strengthens their position. It *recognises* that there are significant differences between the two groups. If these differences are so great that they cannot be resolved through *negotiation*, it implies acceptance that this means there will be an end to the *collaboration* phase, and the start of a *cooperation* phase, and the acceptance of irreconcilable differences between both sides, i.e. *disintegration*.

In the 1918 elections Sinn Féin, the party representing Irish Republicans, won 73 of the 105 seats; the Unionists won 26 seats and a majority of the vote in just four of the 32 counties. (Later these were to become four out of the six counties of Northern Ireland. It is believed that if partition had been based on these four counties Northern Ireland might now be more stable,

because the question of Catholics outnumbering Protestants sometime in the future would not arise.)

At the end of the 1919-1921 Irish War of Independence the British Government initiated negotiations with representatives of both the Republicans and the Unionists. This created some initial euphoria amongst nationalists that the war had been won, and heightened expectations that this involved *recognition* of the Republic, despite the obvious difficulties with the Unionist minority.

The Republicans had similar *dilemmas* to do with their authority to *negotiate*. At the time of the 1916 Rising the Republicans were a collection of different groups, including the Irish Volunteers, the Irish Citizen Army, and the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB, a secret society with its own oath of allegiance), all with their own leaderships. From 1917 onwards Cathal Brugha, who was to be Minister for Defence during the War of Independence, endeavoured to combine these into one Republican army. (See biographical note for link with author.) He was successful except in the case of the IRB, which continued in existence as a second channel of power. In an attempt to bring the members of the IRB under control of the Army and Parliament he succeeded in getting a bill passed requiring members of parliament and officers in the army to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic and to parliament. This failed to destroy the IRB and led to its being taken over by a smaller group who were even less amenable to control, the leader of which was his colleague in cabinet Michael Collins, who was also Director of Intelligence in the army. This oath of allegiance to the Republic was at least partly responsible for later creating a dilemma when a large minority of the army refused to *recognise* the treaty that disestablished the Republic, even though it had been adopted by parliament.

When the British proposed *negotiations*, the Republicans were happy to be invited to talks, because this implied British *recognition* of their position. But they had the *negotiation dilemma* that many who had fought in the War of Independence would not give *recognition* to any settlement less than full sovereignty. And they were not experienced negotiators, whereas the British were highly experienced.

The Irish negotiation team included the more militant Michael Collins and people who were more likely to settle such as Arthur Griffith, who was the original founder of Sinn Féin. With the British side threatening “immediate and terrible war” the Irish side settled, but with Collins intending to use the treaty as a “stepping-stone” and re-start the war in the north of Ireland. This pressure on the Irish to *agree* to a settlement created a *collaboration dilemma*, leading to *disintegration* within the negotiating team and later with Republicans in Ireland who did not accept the treaty. This dilemma was well described as “the centre cannot hold” by Anglo-Irish poet W.B. Yeats in his poem “The Second Coming”, although he was describing the aftermath of the First World War.

The treaty led to a form of *collaboration* between the British Government and a new Irish Free State, which, after negotiations, was based on 26 out of the 32 counties. This led to *disintegration* in the army and its leadership between those who supported the treaty, and those who refused to accept the outcome despite it being passed by parliament. These wanted to renew the *conflict*. Although no longer a minister, having resigned after the treaty was adopted against his advice, Brugha and others prevented the army from revolting. This led to a second split, this time within the anti-treaty group. A minority including the army leadership occupied the Four Courts in Dublin in an act of *confrontation* with the British, in the hope that threatening hostilities would *induce* former comrades now in the Free State army to re-unite with them

(against the common enemy). For months the two anti-treaty groups *negotiated*, and may have been close to *integration* when the British exerted “divide-and-rule” pressure by indicating that they would have a *credibility dilemma* with the Free State government if they failed to take action against the extreme Republicans in the Four Courts. Griffith *cooperated* and started the civil war because he felt “in honour bound” (in the sense of his *credibility* as a man of his word) to implement the treaty with the British that he had signed.

This exacerbated the Republicans’ *trust dilemma* with Collins, who had indicated that he intended to *cooperate* with Republicans in joint operations in Northern Ireland. (Collins had previously *reneged* on an electoral pact with the Republican leader, Eamon de Valera, following pressure to do so from the British Government.) Collins died in action in the Irish Civil War. If he had not, Griffith and most of those who supported the treaty would have also had a *trust dilemma* with him, because they had not agreed with Collins’ “stepping-stone” policy of starting a guerrilla war in the North after the settlement.

The British pressure to bomb the Four Courts ensured the split between anti-treaty and pro-treaty sides that has marked Irish politics ever since. It was a successful example of “divide and rule” that weakened the new Free State and left it economically subservient to Britain. After the Civil War Anti-Treaty Republicans, former heroes of the War of Independence, had difficulty getting employment in the Free State. Many of these emigrated, particularly to the United States, and generations later were influential in supporting the IRA in the eighties.

5.1 Discussions in Northern Ireland

For years after the start of the “troubles” in Northern Ireland in 1969 the British Government refused to *negotiate* with Sinn Féin because they supported the IRA. This was partly because of the Government’s ongoing special relationship with Unionists, particularly as held by the Conservative and Unionist Party (that party’s official title). Following the IRA bombing of Bishopsgate in London on April 24th 1993 the British Government started *negotiations*, leading to the Anglo-Irish Downing Street Declaration in December 1993, which stated that any change in the partition of Ireland could only come about with the consent of those living north of the border. Further *negotiations* led to a *unilateral* ceasefire by the IRA on 1st September 1994. This gave *recognition* to the IRA and strengthened its *credibility*.

Subsequently the government was influenced by Unionist unwillingness to *cooperate* due to *distrust*, and may have believed that they had achieved victory over the IRA. They appeared to lose interest in the *negotiations*, or felt they had achieved enough, even though they had not achieved *agreement*. They introduced new demands that the IRA carry out complete decommissioning. This apparent *reneging* on their previous *policy* created a *trust dilemma* with the IRA and a return to *confrontation* and *conflict*. On 9th February 1996 the IRA planted a bomb in the Canary Wharf Towers in London. It appears that the momentum for the British to recommence discussions did not re-develop until after the IRA had renewed its bombing campaign, i.e. attacked them *directly* in their own “*place*” (upper half of Figure 2). On 7th October 1997 formal peace talks commenced that led to the “Good Friday” Agreement of 1998. See Heifetz and Segev (2005) for a game-theoretic discussion of how *escalation* “may loosen the incentives to exercise long delays in the course of bargaining”.

Another *recognition dilemma* caused by British discussions with Sinn Féin related to the position of the government of the Republic. The Irish Government’s view has always been that

the IRA was not necessary, and that it would not have re-formed if the Civil Rights Movement of 1968 had led to real progress in securing equal rights for Catholics instead of repression. The IRA was a reaction to failure by the British to protect Catholic enclaves from attack.

Negotiation should resolve problems, and strengthen the bonds between both parties, or between the communities they represent. So, while the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland continues to exist (as a *collaboration*) the UK Government should not appear to be *negotiating* because they were forced. In the *negotiations* they should be impartial and even-handed. And they should be committed to ensuring that the *negotiations* succeed.

The biggest obstacle in the *negotiations* in Northern Ireland has always been a fear culture amongst Loyalists that cannot see the possibility of *collaboration* with Nationalists. For centuries they had been told to believe a simple game model: what the Nationalists/Catholics win the Unionists/Protestants lose, and vice versa. The “Good Friday” Agreement of April 1998 (<http://www.nio.gov.uk/the-agreement>) created structures that have the potential to change this situation and create stable government that has the participation of both sides. The structures have three parts: British/Irish, North/South and within Northern Ireland. The idea is to have as much *collaboration* as possible within Northern Ireland, although on a partnership basis amongst the bigger parties, and if there are problems remaining to resolve them by *collaboration* between North and South, and finally by *collaboration* between Britain and the Irish Government.

The main problem not dealt with in the *negotiations* related to security and policing of beleaguered Catholic enclaves. Unionists, both the moderate Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the more extreme Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), had a *trust dilemma* about participating in government with Sinn Féin because the IRA had not decommissioned its arms and disbanded. The IRA had a *trust dilemma* about standing down while there was insecurity in nationalist areas, particularly where there had been loyalist “pogroms” and burning of nationalist homes especially in Belfast and, in some cases, where information about the whereabouts of nationalist activists had been passed to loyalist paramilitaries by members of the police. The investigations are still continuing into the allegations of police collusion in the murders of Belfast lawyers Pat Finucane and Rosemary Nelson who had represented nationalists. The IRA felt that they would have a *credibility dilemma* if they disbanded, if subsequently there were attacks by Loyalists on Catholic areas. The danger was that the vacuum of defenceless Catholic areas would be filled by the growth of more extreme splinter groups such as the “Continuity IRA” and the “Real IRA”.

The ongoing mutual *trust dilemma* led to a “stand-off” between the DUP and Sinn Féin and the collapse of *cooperation* in the Government within Northern Ireland. The British Government made the mistake of going into prolonged *negotiations* with the DUP and Sinn Féin to deal with their differences, and excluding the middle ground larger parties, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the Social Democrat and Labour Party (SDLP).

This caused the dilemma for moderate voters on both sides, in that the British Government was *recognising* the DUP and Sinn Féin as *negotiators* on behalf of their communities, and the UUP and SDLP as irrelevant. The context was a game between nationalists and unionists, in which the British Government had indicated that they would be willing to leave Northern Ireland if a majority voted for such an outcome. Currently the “score” in this game is a small majority vote for unionists instead of nationalists. In the context of this game, why should a citizen vote for the UUP or the SDLP if the British Government is not including them in discussions? Subsequent elections reduced the middle ground UUP and SDLP to minority parties. This has made *cooperation* between both sides even more difficult, and *collaboration* a distant prospect.

As I write the U.K. and Irish Prime Ministers are trying to *induce* the northern parties to re-establish decentralised government. In the background is the *deterrent*, mainly directed at the DUP, that failure to agree could lead to more involvement by the Irish Government through the North/South body.

6. Unilateralism

We now suggest “*unilateralism*” as the other *collaboration* activity. *Unilateralism* is contrasted with multilateralism. It omits the element of reciprocity, and is sometimes understood to mean not having alliances. In *adjustment* decision-making *unilateralism* is a *pounce* activity, one that an executive in “*place*” in a company takes using his / her *position* without reference to anyone else. The assumption is that he is empowered to do so, acts on behalf of the company (the people with whom he is in *collaboration*), and the others will be pleased that he / she did so (in the long run). In politics “in the long run” might mean in the judgement of history in decades to come, as President George W. Bush has suggested in justification of the U.S. *unilateral* invasion of Iraq to deal with alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and/or change of political regime.

The current U.S. defence of *unilateralism* is presented as a *deterrence* dilemma:

In 9/11, the profound threat from WMD, terrorism, and radical Islamic movements coalesced in a single convulsive act. The weakness, paralysis, and ineffectuality of such multilateral responses to the threat, as the United Nations (UN) and European Union might muster, mandate an American policy of “self-reliance, independence, and even unilateralism.” The long-familiar strategy of containment is ill-adapted to provide security in the face of the new threat because the enemy is at once so amorphous and fragmented that American power cannot be applied in a deterrent role. Moreover, if deterrence fails, the consequences could be horrific. Thus a more aggressive strategy is indicated, allowing for pre-emptive and preventive attacks by the United States to forestall intended terrorist attacks. Like the Cold War, the war on terror is likely to be long and costly, but it is unavoidable.

(Paraphrased from Prof. Robert Lieber (2004) at a panel discussion on “American Grand Strategy in the Global War on Terrorism” at a Strategy Conference in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.)

The most worrying aspect of this view is the way that it dismisses *indirect action*, i.e. the bottom half of Figure 2, and points to isolationism as an assumption of U.S. policy. Its consequence is “gun boat diplomacy”, which is sometimes called “forward presence”.

The key policy advisers do not unanimously hold this view. Speaking at the same meeting, Wohlforth (2004) rejected *unilateralism* because it “undermines key alliances and partnerships”. U.S. government policy is also challenged by people with military experience, for example Retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., in a talk on “Confrontation or Cooperation? - The growing isolation of the United States” (2000).

The question is, what determines if *unilateralist* actions are acceptable, or indeed necessary? The underlying assumption is that both sides are in *agreement*, to such an extent that each allows the other a cushion of freedom to act *unilaterally*. The *unilateralist dilemma* is that the actions

that appear to break this *agreement* will cause a “**backlash**” reaction. *Adjustment* decision-making is about balance. Imbalance can go either way. *Unilateralism* can also mean opting to not defend one’s interests, or to do a lot less than might be expected. Wohlforth (2004) suggested this as one of two strategies that America can play in the Global War on Terrorism “simply to resign from the national order, breaking free and reaping the advantages that total autonomy would bring”. The *backlash* in this case is that they would “forfeit what are often the very real benefits of association with other states – cooperation, assistance and enhanced legitimacy”.

Wohlforth’s alternative suggestion was *cooperation*, “to participate vigorously in international institutions and seek to shape the world to our own ends”. This, however, has the *dilemma* of depending on getting the *agreement* of international partners, “having to submit to constraints that run counter to our interests when, regardless of our power, we cannot carry the day in the governing forums”. His preference was for an “indirect approach rather than the direct approach in fighting terrorist threats”, focusing on *policy-making* and *inducements* with other governments. This puts him at the bottom of the cycle in Figure 2.

Hamm *et al.* (2002) have also argued against U.S. *unilateralism* and in favour of “world politics based on a cooperative world domestic policy”, including *cooperation* with the Muslim world. In reflecting how world politics took a turn toward multilaterally backed US *unilateralism* in the weeks after the 11th September 2001, they suggested that, rather than complain, Europe should build its capacities to “lend its weight to shaping the 21st century’s world policy and world economy”.

The case that the U.S. could be a global policeman dealing with international terrorism suffers from a *collaboration dilemma*. Despite its wealth and resources, the U.S. does not have the capacity to police the whole world *directly* as one *integrated* unit under U.S. control or influence. The argument against U.S. *unilateralism* seems finally to have been won now that prominent neo-conservatives have come on board such as Francis Fukuyama (2006),

Another example of how *unilateralism* could cause *disintegration* is in Canada, where Alain Noël (2001) has described the relationship between the Government of Quebec and the Federal Government of Canada as a “collaborative federalism”. He has criticised (P. 12) “unilateral federal initiatives ... that increase control or freedom for the federal government” despite a social union process that was (P. 13) “initiated precisely to circumscribe the power of the federal government to change at will the rules of the game”.

6.1 Backlash Against Repression

Ronald Francisco (2001) has discussed the “dictator’s dilemma” of a *backlash* to repression, an extreme form of *unilateralism* that is used to quell revolt. He analysed the short-term *backlashes* and long-term results of ten harsh repressions: Amritsar, India in 1919, Bloody Sunday, Derry, Ireland in 1972, Bachelor’s Walk, Dublin in 1914, Pidjiguiti, Guinea-Bissau in 1959, Prague in 1989, Sharpeville, South Africa in 1960, Soweto, South Africa in 1976, Bloody Sunday, St. Petersburg, Russia in 1905, Tiananmen Square, Beijing in 1989, and Wujek, Poland in 1981 (Table 1, p.3). He concluded (p. 5) that “harsh repression, in the long run, helps dissidents to eliminate dictatorship”. While true for these and many other cases, it is not true for others. The question is when is *unilateralism* excessive so that it creates a *backlash*? One form of repression, the arrest and imprisonment of dissident leaders such as Nelson Mandela in South

Africa, Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, Mahatma Gandhi in India, and Charles Stewart Parnell, the Head of the Land League in Ireland, was based on the wrong assumption that, leaderless, their movements would collapse and normal *collaboration* would *re-integrate*. On the contrary, the *backlash* led to the conferring of a “badge of honour” on the inmates, and to the *escalation* of dissidence. This can be seen in the top of Figure 2 as the *adjusting* cycle going in the wrong direction to that intended by the authorities.

According to Francisco, one of the reasons for the *backlash* in all ten cases was the involvement of dissident leaders, although he was not sure about the Bachelor’s Walk incident. In fact it applies here also. In 1913 the House of Commons passed a bill providing for Home Rule for Ireland. The Unionists, whose position of supremacy in the north of Ireland depended on British *direct* involvement, opposed this, formed the Ulster Volunteers with 100,000 men, illegally imported arms at Larne, and threatened to take over army barracks. This led to a brief mutiny by British officers stationed at the Curragh, who refused to take action against their traditional Unionist allies. The Irish Volunteers were formed as a counter force to protect nationalists. In July of 1914 an English born Protestant Irish nationalist, Erskine Childers (author of the first international spy novel, the “Riddle of the Sands”, whose son was later to be elected President of Ireland), imported arms into Howth in Dublin so that the Volunteers would be in a position to defend the population in the event of civil war. The police were instructed to take these arms from the Volunteers at Bachelor’s Walk. This failed when two policemen refused to obey. (These were dismissed from the force, but later reinstated after appeal to the Westminster Parliament partially on the grounds that the illegal arms importation had some justification under the circumstances.) The army opened fire on an unarmed group of Dublin civilians jeering the failure to disarm the Volunteers, killing four and wounding thirty seven. This event led to a *backlash* in Dublin and was important in turning the tide of support in favour of the Volunteers prior to 1916. It represented a starting point in the *adjusting* cycle (Figure 2) that describes a process of movement away from *agreement* and towards *disagreement*. It showed a limit to the extent that the public would tolerate *unilateralist* action by soldiers against civilians.

6.2 The Irish War of Independence

The War of Independence commenced after the Sinn Féin representatives elected in the 1918 general election set up a parliament in Dublin and declared a republic in January 1919. For over a year the emphasis was less on military engagements and more on forming institutions and making the British presence irrelevant. After Dublin and the “Pale” area around it, and Unionist Belfast, the British had had a very strong influence in Cork City. A turning point in the war was when successes in County Cork began to impinge on the city. Ambushes of troop movements led to retaliation, and a cycle of *escalation* and *disintegration* of British rule throughout 1920.

On March 19th the Royal Irish Constabulary (police) assassinated the Lord Mayor of Cork, Tomás Mac Curtain, as he was sleeping in his own home. The Coroner’s Court found the British Government jointly responsible. On March 25th the British introduced the “Black and Tans”, an armed terrorist force that proceeded to carry out acts of brutality throughout Ireland that the regular police and army could not be relied upon to do. On May 13th they introduced the “Auxiliaries”, ex officers of the army, but who were not under military discipline or amenable to trial by the civil courts (MacArdle, 1951). News of atrocities perpetrated by the Black and Tans spread and, on June 28th caused a *backlash* amongst some soldiers of an Irish regiment, the

Connaught Rangers, in Jullundur barracks, India, who informed an NCO that they could no longer obey orders.

On August 12th Mac Curtain's successor as Lord Mayor, Terence MacSwiney, was arrested and immediately commenced a hunger-strike as a *unilateral* challenge to the army's authority to arrest him. Towards the end there were pleas of clemency from King George V to the Prime Minister, Lloyd George. These were rejected because of fears that changing their *position* would make them *vulnerable* to an *escalation* of *conflict*, and mean an end to their attempts to regain control in Ireland. On October 25th MacSwiney died after 74 days on hunger strike, causing a world-wide *backlash* against British rule (MacSwiney Brugha, 2005). Tens of thousands turned out for his funeral procession in London. His funeral on October 31st had huge impact in Cork and throughout Ireland.

On November 1st, Kevin Barry, an 18-year old medical student and Volunteer, who had been captured following participating in an ambush, was hanged in Dublin after refusing to divulge the names of his comrades despite being tortured. On November 2nd 20-year old Private James Daly, the leader of the Connaught Rangers' mutiny was executed in India.

During October seventeen Irishmen were murdered under circumstances that suggested an *escalation* of activities by the British forces. On the morning of November 21st Collins' Counter-Intelligence Service assassinated fourteen British spies in Dublin. In revenge, the British Auxiliaries went on a killing spree at a football match in Croke Park, having first tossed a coin to decide whether they would loot O'Connell Street instead. This event is also known as "Bloody Sunday".

On November 28th the Volunteers, under the leadership of Tom Barry, an ex British soldier, carried out the most successful ambush to date of the War of Independence killing seventeen Auxiliaries in Kilmichael, County Cork. On December 11th they carried out an attack on Auxiliaries near their barracks in Cork City. While retaliation was expected, the *backlash* was completely out of proportion. Auxiliaries and Black-and-Tans spent the night in an organised looting of shops and burning of the central shopping district of Cork City, and preventing the fire brigade from putting out the fires, including in the City Hall, which was burned to the ground. Although the British Army participated they were more restrained than the others, many of whom became drunk from stolen alcohol as the night wore on.

During this time of *escalation* and *backlash* the British were privately initiating *negotiations* to start a truce. It is not clear to what extent this "*conflict spiral*" was locally organised or under instructions from London. Britain appeared to be losing control, not only of Ireland, but also of their own forces because they could not recruit any better than the Auxiliaries and Black-and-Tans. Might Britain have been *escalating* the *conflict* in order to test the endurance of the Irish struggle? The instructions given by the officers suggest that they were intentionally using repression. What is most unusual about the Burning of Cork and Bloody Sunday in Croke Park is that the *backlash* was a spontaneous reaction by British soldiers that lost control, not the usual form of *backlash* by the public against the authorities. It seems to indicate acceptance on the ground that control over the *place* that was Ireland had been lost.

6.3 Conflict Spirals

The normal *adjusting* cycle runs clock-wise as a form of problem-solving (see Figure 2). When in a relationship one starts by assuming that *collaboration* is possible. One turns to *cooperation*

only when there are difficulties with the relationship. If that fails one uses *confrontation*. One turns to *conflict* only when all else fails. The *adjuster* controls the *adjusting* process, and only makes the *pragmatic* decision to move to the next activity when it is *prevented* from making further progress (Axiom 18 above). We will see in the second paper that conflict resolution is an *adapting* process (Axiom 31 “Adapting”: Brugha and Bowen, 2005): “Adapting uses an *adjusting* process but in reverse order to the normal problem-solving sequence.” Conflict resolution starts when both parties agree that it is a win-win game for both to turn away from *conflict*, and *confront* one another. The aim is to move from *confrontation* into *cooperation*, and from *cooperation* into *collaboration*. The other party appears to control the *adapting* process, in that no move can be made until both agree.

The move from *backlash* to *escalation* is part of what we define here as an “*adapting conflict spiral*” in which the *adjuster* loses control of the dynamic. (We include *adapting* in this definition because, in the second paper, we will describe a different form of *conflict spiral*.) In this paper we have described four *general* and eight *principal political adjusting dilemmas*. At an even higher level we define an “*overall political adjusting dilemma*” to be that the *adjusting* process might be reversed and turned into an *adapting conflict spiral*. This could happen at any of the *general phases* or *principal stages*.

Richardson and Burk (2003, based on Carpenter and Kennedy (2001)) give a full example of this in the context of an organisation disintegrating. Their case illustration is different to the purely political cases in this paper. Consequently, the terminology that emerged out of Drama Theory does not describe this adequately. The match is clearer when one uses the more generic *adjusting* terminology as follows.

First “the problem emerges” in the *practice* of dealing with some issue. Next “sides form” and people are *pliable* enough to take positions aligned with those who hold similar views. Then “positions harden” and people find it more *productive* to talk more with those with similar views, and less with those with whom they *disagree*. After that “communication stops” as people confine their discussions in public to *promoting* their own point of view. This is the end of the left side of Figure 2. The difference between that and the right side is that the next four steps are more uncertain, which reflects the fundamental difference between *planning* and *putting*. First “sides strengthen their positions” as they build *policy* support with outsiders. Next “perceptions become distorted” as people are “*priced*” (valued) in “black and white” terms to do with which side are they on. Then a “sense of crisis emerges” as people become willing to apply even extreme *procedures* that might help their side succeed. After that “outcomes vary” as people “*pounce*” on any solution, including violence, which might help.

It appears that political or organizational dissidents try to force the stronger party to *adapt* by frustrating the others’ attempts to bring about the *adjustments* that diffuse dispute. Francisco (p. 19, 2001) suggests that dissidents use *adaptation* in another way, namely as tactics to minimize losses so as to maximize the *productivity* of their dissidence. Because they are weaker they constantly change the form of their dissidence. However, they only succeed if extreme levels of repression help them to “remove the mask of benevolence from a dictatorial regime”. The final stage is one of continuous and mutual *conflict* and *threat* (See Figure 2).

MacSwiney’s hunger-strike is an example of this *productivity*. His personal stance was aimed at *persuading* the British Empire to give Ireland its freedom, at the cost of minimal Irish losses (his life) instead of on the battle-field. His was a different form of win-win game. If they released him their moral authority would be diminished, because he had challenged their right to

charge him when his only “crime” was that he was carrying out his duties as a member of parliament and Lord Mayor of Cork. If they did not release him they ran the risk of spread of dissidence throughout the empire, through inspiring reactions in India and other colonies, as indeed happened.

The natural preference that military leaders have for *unilateralism* instead of *negotiation* can lead to an *adapting conflict spiral*. The Irish Civil War, discussed earlier, was started as a *unilateralist* proposal by Tom Barry to return to war as a way to re-unify the army against the common enemy. When this failed and the shelling of the Four Courts commenced the very numerous Anti-Treaty forces occupied areas around O’Connell Street partly as a diversion to relieve attention from the Four Courts Garrison (and thus *re-integrate* Anti-Treaty forces) and also as a show of strength to the Pro-Treaty Free State forces (in the hope of getting them to *re-integrate* with them). This high-risk *unilateral* action was a disaster. British heavy artillery succeeded in destroying both the Four Courts and then the buildings held by the garrisons in O’Connell Street. A sniper killed former Minister for Defence Brugha as he was in the course of evacuating the last-held post in O’Connell Street (MacSwiney Brugha, 2005). From then on the Civil War deteriorated into a bitter *conflict spiral* known in Irish as “Cogadh na gCarad” (the war of friends).

7. Review

This paper is one of a series developing the field of Nomology, the science of the laws of the mind, a meta-model of the structures used in decision-making. It shows that political decision-making is a form of *adjusting* that works as part of a third *layer* within a *framework* where the first two higher layers are about *committing* and *convincing*. A second paper on political decision processes, to appear in a later issue of this journal, will use this three *layer framework* to explain how countries spiral into conflict, and also how the *adjusting* system can help to explain conflict resolution.

The paper described the structure of political *adjustment* decision-making. This involves four bipolar dimensions, about positions (*agree/disagree*), about action (*direct/indirect*), about the way to address problems (*personal/positional*) and about approaches to solve them (*pure/pragmatic*). These produce four *general* and eight *principal political activities*, each with its own (*pragmatic*) dilemma, i.e. twenty-four *constructs*. Together these constructs form a nomological map of the territory of political decision-making. The map has various possible uses.

1. It helps to fill gaps in maps of territories, in this case Drama Theory, which currently is used to inform discussions about U.S. and U.K. policy on international terrorism. The unmapped area is the top right quadrant of Figure 2.
2. It helps to identify missing issues. We used the generic *adjustment* structure to extend the six dilemmas of Drama Theory into eight *activities*, adding *unilateralism*, which has the dilemma that it may cause a *backlash*, and *negotiation*, which has the dilemma that it involves *recognition* of one’s opponent.
3. It helps to clarify the distinctions between issues. For example *backlash* and *incitement* seem similar because they are both reactions. Actually they are very different. *Backlash* is a somewhat spontaneous reaction by the public in some *place* against a generally

accepted authority that has *unilaterally* over-stepped the bounds of expected behaviour. *Incitement* is where *people* who disagree with the authorities feel the temptation to transgress a boundary that was meant to *deter* them from causing trouble.

4. It can help to identify links between issues. *Unilateralism* and *negotiation* were shown to be aspects of *collaboration*, which implies some form of co-ownership of *political* processes.
5. It can help to guide people who might want to move between territories, for instance from *conflict* into *confrontation*. People are very reluctant to leave the space that they know until they are given a route map to the new territory.

The paper has current relevance in that it addresses a gap in U.S. foreign policy that has been relying too much on a *unilateralist* policy to international terrorism, which has led to a *backlash* against America. They face a *collaboration* dilemma, which is that global *integration* is impossible, that they cannot successfully become policeman for the world. They should move in the direction of international *cooperation*.

The coincidence between the deficiency in Drama Theory and U.S. over-usage of *unilateralism* gives reason for hope. We have identified a gap in the thinking of the advisors to the advisors of U.S. and U.K. policy-makers about international politics, who meet regularly at International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposia (ICCRTS) under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense. It is possible that filling the gap in the map might help to add clarity to their policy discussions, and also might help others in a position of influence to understand U.S. and U.K. policies.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Professor Ken Bowen of Royal Holloway, University of London, for his collaboration on a previous paper, for introducing him to Drama Theory, and for his valuable comments on this paper. I would also like to thank for their detailed comments: Professor John Murphy of Manchester Business School, Professor Richard Ormerod of Warwick Business School, Dr. Josep Ventura and Mr. Des Fisher.

Biographical Note

The author, Dr Cathal MacSwiney Brugha comes from a family that has been deeply involved in Irish history and politics. Dr. Brugha was himself a member of the National Executive of Fianna Fáil during the turbulent period from 1971 to 1984, but left politics to become a full-time academic. Both this and the second paper in a later issue are dedicated to the author's father, Ruairi, who died on January 30th 2006, then 88 years old. He was a member of the European Parliament and of the Dáil and Seanad (lower and upper houses of the Irish Parliament), representing Fianna Fáil (the Republican Party), Ireland's largest political party and the inheritor of the republican tradition. As Opposition Spokesman for Northern Ireland affairs in Dáil Éireann he developed a new policy for Fianna Fáil to rely on conciliation to unite the people of Ireland as a path to ending partition.

Ruairi's father, Cathal Brugha (formerly Charles Burgess) was Minister for Defence during the Irish War of Independence with Britain (1919-1921) and died in action in the Civil War in 1922. In 1914 he was in charge of a section of the Irish Volunteers that received the guns brought into

Dublin. During a confrontation at Bachelor's Walk two of the police who were ordered to take the guns from the Volunteers refused to do so, thus averting conflict, and were immediately dismissed. The author's wife, Catherine (née Jennings), is the granddaughter of Andrew O'Neill, who was one of the two.

The author's mother, Máire MacSwiney Brugha, now 87 years old, has just published her autobiography "History's Daughter". Her father was Terence MacSwiney, the Lord Mayor of Cork, who died in 1920 in Brixton Prison, London, after a 74-day hunger strike. Her Aunt Mary MacSwiney, another staunch Republican, was a formidable lady who refused to accept the outcome of the 1922 treaty between the Irish and the British: she had a profound influence on Máire's life.

REFERENCES:

- Bennett, P. (1998). "Confrontation analysis as a diagnostic tool", *European Journal of Operational Research* 109, pp. 465-482.
- Brugha, C. and Bowen, K. (2005). "Decision Research Using Cognitive Structures", *Systemic Practice and Action Research*. Vol. 18.1, 67-88.
- Brugha, C., (1998a). "The structure of qualitative decision-making", *European Journal of Operational Research*, 104 (1), 46-62.
- Brugha, C., (1998b). "The structure of adjustment decision making", *European Journal of Operational Research*, 104 (1), 63-76.
- Brugha, C., (1998c). "The structure of development decision making", *European Journal of Operational Research*, 104 (1), 77-92.
- Brugha, C., (2001). "A Decision-Science Based Discussion of the Systems Development Life Cycle in Information Systems", *Information Systems Frontiers*, Special Issue on *Philosophical Reasoning in Information Systems Research*, Vol. 3.1, 91-105.
- Bryant, J.W. (2004). *Drama theory as the behavioural rationale in agent-based models*, in *Analysing Conflict and its Resolution*, Conference of the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications, 28-30th June, Oxford, <http://www.ima.org.uk/conflict/papers/Bryant.pdf>
- Carpenter, S.L. and Kennedy, W.J.D. (2001). *Managing public disputes: a practical guide for government, business, and citizens' groups*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Carroll, Eugene J., Jr., (2000). *Confrontation or Cooperation? - The growing isolation of the United States*, Address to Physicians for Global Survival and the Group of 78, Ottawa, Canada; The Canadian Centres for Teaching Peace, <http://www.peace.ca/confrontationorcooperation.htm>. See also <http://www.cdi.org/dm/1999/may99dm.pdf>.
- Crannell, M., Howard, N., Norwood, G.W., and Tait, A. (2005). *A C2 System for 'Winning hearts and minds': Tools for Confrontation and Collaboration Analysis*, at The 10th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (ICCRTS), http://www.dodccrp.org/events/10th_ICCRTS/CD/papers/361.pdf
- De Paor, L., (1971). *Divided Ulster*, Penguin, p. 27.
- Francisco, Ronald (2001). *The Dictator's Dilemma*, Conference on Repression and Mobilization: What Do We Know and Where Do We Go From Here?, University of Maryland, June 21-24.
- Fukuyama, Francis (2006). *After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads*, Profile Books Ltd.
- Hallinan, C. (2004). *Divide & Rule* (posted July 10, 2004), <http://www.portside.org/showpost.php?postid=427>
- Hamilton, W., (1877). "Lectures on Metaphysics, Vols. 1 & 2", 6th Ed., in *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic*, Edinburgh & London: William Blackwood & Sons.
- Hamm, B., Hippler, J., Messner, D. and Weller, C. (2002). *World Politics at the Crossroads - The 11th of September 2001 and the Aftermath*, Development and Peace Foundation/Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (SEF), Gotenstr. 152, D-53175 Bonn, http://www.sef-bonn.org/download/publikationen/policy_paper/pp_19_en.pdf
- Heifetz, A., and Segev, E. (2005). "Escalation and Delay in Protracted International Conflicts", *Mathematical Social Sciences*, Vol. 49, 17-37.
- Howard, Nigel, Bennett, Peter G., Bryant, Jim W. and Bradley, Morris (1992). "Manifesto for a Theory of Drama and Irrational Choice" *J.Opl Res.Soc.* 44, 99-103

- Howard, Nigel (1994). "Drama Theory and its Relationship to Game Theory", *Group Decision and Negotiation* 3, 187-206 and 207-253.
- Iivari, J., Hirscheim, R., Klein, H.K., (1998). "A Paradigmatic Analysis Contrasting Information Systems Development Approaches and Methodologies". *Information Systems Research*, 9 (2), 164-193.
- Kant, I., (1985). *Critique of Pure Reason*. (Based on 1929 translation by Norman Kemp Smith) McMillan, (First pub. 1781). See also <http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html>
- Kant, I., (1987). *Critique of Judgement*. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co. (First pub. 1790). See trans. by James Creed Meredith at <http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/critique-of-judgment.txt>
- Kubler-Ross, E. (1969). *On Death and Dying*, New York: Macmillan.
- Lieber, R. (2004). "Panel I: American Grand Strategy in the Global War on Terrorism" in Matthews, L.J., *Conference Report: Winning the War by Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and Post-Conflict in the 21st Century*, Fifteenth Annual Strategy Conference, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, April 13-15, 2004
- MacArdle, Dorothy, (1951). *The Irish Republic*, 4th Ed. The Irish Press Ltd., Dublin.
- MacSwiney Brugha, Máire, (2005). *History's Daughter*, O'Brien Press, Dublin.
- Maslow, A., (1987). *Motivation and Personality*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Maslow, A. (1971), *The Farther Reaches of Human Nature*, New York: Penguin.
- Murray-Jones, P., and Howard, N. (1999). *Confrontation Analysis: a Command and Control System for Conflicts Other Than War*, The 1999 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (CCRTS), http://www.dodccrp.org/events/1999_CCRTS/pdf_files/track_3/042howar.pdf
- Murray-Jones, P., Stubbs, L. and Howard, N. (2003). *Testing and automating human interactions in Peace and Stabilisation Operations*, The 8th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (ICCRTS), http://www.dodccrp.org/events/8th_ICCRTS/pdf/134.pdf
- Noël, Alain, (2001). "Power and Purpose in Intergovernmental Relations", *Policy Matters*, Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2:6.
- Richardson, Jean and Burk, Lisa, (2003), *When Conflict Spirals Out of Control*, Interaction Management, <http://www.bjrcom.com/downloads/>
- Tappan, Henry P., (1855). *Elements of Logic; Together with an Introductory View of Philosophy in General and a Preliminary View of the Reason*. New York: D. Appleton and Company (first published 1844: New York and London: Wiley & Putnam).
- Wohlforth, W. (2004). "Panel I: American Grand Strategy in the Global War on Terrorism" in Matthews, L.J., *Conference Report: Winning the War by Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and Post-Conflict in the 21st Century*, Fifteenth Annual Strategy Conference, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, April 13-15, 2004.